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Empirical studies showed that ￿rm-level volatility has been increasing but the aggregate
volatility has been decreasing in the US for the post-war period. This paper proposes a uni￿ed
explanation for these diverging trends. Our explanation is based on a story of ￿nancial develop-
ment ￿measured by the reduction of borrowing constraints because of greater access to external
￿nancing and options for risk sharing. By constructing a dynamic stochastic general-equilibrium
model of heterogenous ￿rms facing borrowing constraints and investment irreversibility, it is
shown that ￿nancial liberalization increases the lumpiness of ￿rm-level investment but decreases
the variance of aggregate output. Hence, the model predicts that ￿nancial development leads
to a larger ￿rm-level volatility but a lower aggregate volatility. In addition, our model is also
consistent with the observed decline in volatility of private held ￿rms which do not have (or
have only limited) access to external funds.
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11 Introduction
Empirical studies show that ￿rm-level volatility (for publicly traded ￿rms) has been increasing but
the aggregate volatility has been decreasing in the U.S. for the post-war period. In particular, using
￿nancial data, Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu (2001) and Comin (2000) document an increase
in volatility of ￿rm-level stock returns. Using accounting data, Chaney, Gabaix, and Philippon
(2002), Comin and Mulani (2005, 2006) and Comin and Philippon (2005) show an increase the
idiosyncratic variability of capital investment, employment, sales, and earnings across ￿rms. On
the other hand, macroeconomic time series exhibit a signi￿cant downward trend in the variability of
GDP and other major aggregate variables in the post-war period, particularly since the mid 1980￿ s.
For example, McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000) show that the volatility of GDP has declined
signi￿cantly since the mid 1980￿ s. Blanchard and Simon (2002) document a downward trend in the
volatility of GDP beginning in the 50￿ s with an interruption in the 70￿ s. Stock and Watson (2002)
con￿rm that the decline in aggregate volatility is pervasive among almost all macro variables for
the post-war period, especially starting in the mid 1980s.
Figure 1. Diverging Trends of Volatility in the U.S..
2Figure 1 illustrates the trend dynamics of the U.S. data. The left window shows the standard
deviation of annual real GDP gowth rate based on a 20-year moving average rolling window (scaled
up by 10). The right window shows the standard deviation of ￿rms￿sales growth rate (source:
Comin and Philippon, 2005, Fig. 1). The diverging trends in micro and macro economic volatility
in the post-war period appears puzzling because macro movements are often thought as simple
aggregations of micro movements. Namely, a declining trend in macroeconomic volatility should
re￿ ect a similar trend at the micro level, instead of the opposite.
In this paper we propose an explanation for this diverging-trend puzzle based on a story of
￿nancial development. The ￿nancial system has evolved signi￿cantly in many ways during the
post-war period. Some of this evolution has been market-driven, and some owes to government
deregulation policy.1 In one way or another, ￿nancial development reduces borrowing constraints
and promotes risk sharing across ￿rms by giving them greater access to external ￿nancing and
investment options. With less borrowing constraint, irreversible ￿xed investment at the ￿rm level
may become more responsive to idiosyncratic shocks to investment opportunities. Financial devel-
opment at the same time also promotes better risk sharing and credit-resource allocation so that
￿rms receiving unfavorable productivity shocks can postpone ￿xed investment and divert resources
to savings with better returns through ￿nancial intermediation, which in turn allows more produc-
tive ￿rms to raise external funds to invest in ￿xed capital. Thus, with ￿nancial development the
most productive ￿rms can undertake more ￿xed investment by raising external funds while the less
productive ￿rms can avoid losses by investing (directly or indirectly) in the ￿nancial assets of the
productive ￿rms,2 making ￿rm-level capital investment lumpier and more volatile.
On the other hand, better access to external ￿nancing implies that aggregate productivity
shocks, which a⁄ect ￿rms￿pro￿ts, will have less direct impact on capital investment when ￿rms are
less dependent on internal cash ￿ ows for ￿nancing. Therefore, ￿nancial development can increase
the variance of ￿rm-level investment but decrease the variance of aggregate investment simultane-
ously.
The above intuition is illustrated in this paper using a general-equilibrium model of heteroge-
nous ￿rms facing borrowing constraints and investment irreversibility.3 We show that, for publicly
traded ￿rms who are able to obtain external funds by issuing debt, a reduction in ￿nancial market
frictions increases the lumpiness of ￿rm-level investment (consequently, dividend and stock prices
also become more variable across ￿rms) but decrease the variance of aggregate investment, employ-
ment, and output. Hence, the model predicts that ￿nancial development leads to a larger ￿rm-level
1See Frame and White (2004) and Dynan, Elmendorf and Sichel (2006a) for literature overview.
2Notice that stocks, equities and bonds are more reversible than ￿xed investment. Hence, they are more liquid
and can be more attractive when the returns to ￿xed investment is low.
3Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) provide empirical evidence on ￿rms￿borrowing constraints and emphasize
imperfections in markets for equity and debt.
3volatility but a lower aggregate volatility.
We embed the Kiyotaki-Moore (1997) type of ￿nancial frictions into an otherwise standard RBC
model with heterogenous ￿rms.4 In particular, the amount of external debt is limited by collateral
values. However, an important departure of this paper from Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) is that
we do not assume agents to have di⁄erent time discounting factors in order to engage in lending
and borrowing among each other, and we do not require the borrowing constraints to be always
binding. This allows us to conduct quantitative business-cycle analyses under aggregate shocks
without having to worry about the optimality of an always-binding borrowing constraint assumed
in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and by most works in this literature.5
A methodological contribution of this paper is that we derive analytically tractable decision
rules at the ￿rm level despite irreversible investment and borrowing constraints for heterogenous
￿rms. Our method allows us to study the model￿ s aggregate dynamics without having to resort
to numerical approximation methods as in Krusell and Smith (1998), which not only is compu-
tationally costly but also leaves the intuition of the model in a blackbox. Approximations in our
paper are needed only at the aggregate level, for which we can use the standard log-linearization
technique based on the method of Blanchard and Kahn (1980). The advantage of being able to
solve the decision rules analytically at the ￿rm level is that the economic mechanisms a⁄ecting
agents￿decisions become transparent.6
Many theoretical explanations have been proposed in the literature to separately explain the
upward trend of volatility at the ￿rm level and the downward trend at the aggregate level. But few
of them can explain these two stylized facts simultaneously. In fact, most models are silent on the
diverging-trend puzzle, some even imply counterfactual predictions.
For the rise of ￿rm-level volatility, Thesmar and Thoenig (2004) posit that ￿rms can choose
the degree of risk inherent to their operation strategies; thus, ￿nancial market development, by
improving risk sharing between owners of listed ￿rms, increases the willingness of these ￿rms to
take risky bets. This in turn increases ￿rm level uncertainty in sales, employment and pro￿ts.
Using French data, they ￿nd empirical support of the view that ￿rm-level volatility increases
with ￿nancial market development. Comin and Philippon (2005), Irvine and Ponti⁄ (2005) and
Philippon (2003) argue that the increased ￿rm-level volatility may be due to higher competition.
Comin and Mulani (2005) argue that the increased ￿rm-level volatility is driven primarily by
increased R&D innovations. Kaas (2009) develops a real business cycle model with idiosyncratic
productivity shocks and collateral-based borrowing constraints to show that an increase in credit
4Alternative approaches to ￿nancial frictions include Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) and Kiyotaki and
Moore (2008).
5See, e.g., Pintus and Wen (2008) and the references therein.
6Similar methods have been used by Wen (2008) and Wang and Wen (2009) to solve heterogeneous-￿rm models
with inventory investment and borrowing constraints.
4market development relaxes borrowing constraints and thereby also increases the spread between
internal rates of return across ￿rms. As a result, ￿rm growth rates become more volatile.
For the decline in aggregate volatility, several prominent explanations have been proposed in
the literature, including the role played by ￿nancial development (Campbell and Hercowitz, 2006;
Dynan, Elmendorf and Sichel, 2006a,b; Jermann and Quadrini, 2009), milder economic shocks
(Stock and Watson, 2002), improved inventory management (Kahn, McConnel, and Perez-Quiros,
2001), and better monetary policy (Clarida, Gali and Gertler, 2000).
With few exceptions (such as Philippon, 2003; and Comin and Mulani, 2005), none of the
aforementioned studies o⁄er a uni￿ed framework to simultaneously explain the increasing trend in
￿rm-level volatility and the decreasing trend in aggregate volatility.7 Philipon￿ s (2003) explanation
is based on imperfect competition with sticky prices. Increased competition between ￿rms reduces
price stickiness and thus magni￿es the e⁄ects of idiosyncratic productivity shocks on ￿rm-level
activity. This can explain the rise in ￿rm volatility. On the other hand, less price stickiness
reduces the impact of aggregate monetary shocks on economy wide activities. This can explain
the fall in aggregate volatility. Comin and Mulani (2005) present an endogenous growth model to
explain the diverging trends in ￿rm-level and aggregate volatility. In their model, growth is driven
by the development of both idiosyncratic R&D innovations and general innovations that can be
freely adopted by many ￿rms. Firm-level volatility is a⁄ected primarily by R&D innovations while
the variance of aggregate productivity growth is determined mainly by the arrival rate of general
innovations. In their model, the changes of market shares cause endogenous shift in the allocation
of resources from the development of general innovations to the development of R&D innovations,
resulting in an increase in ￿rm-level volatility and a decline in aggregate volatility.
Our paper di⁄ers from the above two theoretical papers in that we emphasize ￿nancial devel-
opment as an important factor of economic stability and growth, which has received an increasing
amount of attention recently from economists (for more recent works along this line, see Wang,
2006; Greenwood, Sanchez, and Wang, 2007; and Jermann and Quadrini, 2009).8 In addition, we
also show that our model has the potential to simultaneously explain a third empirical fact re-
cently discovered in the empirical literature: for privately held ￿rms, volatility and dispersion have
declined in the post-war period, in contrast to publicly traded ￿rms (Davis, Haltiwanger, Jarmin
and Miranda, 2006). Although to explain this third stylized fact is not the focus of our current
7Also see Wang (2006). But Wang￿ s analysis is based on a partial equilibrium approach.
8Jermann and Quadrini (2009) notice ￿rms￿￿nancial ￿ ows at the aggregate level have become more volatile, in
contrast to aggregate output. They propose an explanation for the diverging aggregate trends based on a model
of ￿nancial innovations. In this paper, we focus on the upward trend in ￿rm-level volatilities. Hence, our model
features ￿rm distribution and idiosyncratic shocks, which are absent from Jermann and Quadrini (2009). Wang
(2006) presents a partial equilibrium model of the ￿nancial sector and argues that advances in ￿nancial technology
are the main driving force behind the diverging trends. Our paper shares the same view with Wang (2006) but with
di⁄erent modeling strategies.
5project, it is nonetheless comforting to know that our model is not inconsistent with this fact. The
idea behind our explanation for the third fact is as follows. Financial development in our model im-
proves labor productivity because it enhances aggregate capital accumulation by enabling the most
productive ￿rms to undertake capital investment. Consequently, the e¢ ciency of aggregate invest-
ment rises. As a result, the aggregate capital-labor ratio and the real wage increase with ￿nancial
development. The rising real wage may have at least two consequences and both can signi￿cantly
decrease the volatility of privately held ￿rms. First, higher wage costs generate greater competitive
pressure on the survival of privately held ￿rms who face the same pool of labor force with publicly
traded ￿rms but do not have the same degree of access to external ￿nancing as publicly traded
￿rms. Thus, it becomes much harder for privately-held ￿rms to survive, resulting in a higher degree
of homogeneity across the survived privately-held ￿rms. Second, the cost share of wages increases
with ￿nancial development relative to that of idiosyncratic ￿xed-labor costs. Given that all ￿rms
face more or less identical ￿xed costs, the larger the ￿rm size, the less important are such ￿xed
costs. Because privately-held ￿rms are much smaller in size than publicly-traded ￿rms, the rising
wage share in total costs reduces the sensitivity of ￿rms￿labor demand to idiosyncratic labor costs
more so for privately-held ￿rms than for publicly-traded ￿rms due to di⁄erence in ￿rm size.9 Con-
sequently, volatility and dispersion across ￿rms decrease more signi￿cantly for privately-held ￿rms
than for publicly-traded ￿rms as the wage share increases.10
Our investment model and solution method are also closely related to the theoretical literature
on irreversible investment under uncertainty. In particular, Able and Eberly (1994, 1997) provide
competitive equilibrium models with irreversible investment under uncertainty and characterize
closed-form solutions for optimal investment decision rules. Miao (2005, 2008) provides general
equilibrium models of capital structure with heterogenous ￿rms facing irreversible investment and
borrowing constraints. This literature uses continuous time framework in order to derive analyti-
cally closed-form solutions. To our best knowledge, we are the ￿rst to derive closed-form solutions
in a discrete-time framework with irreversible investment and borrowing constraints.
2 The Benchmark Model
2.1 The Firm￿ s Problem
There is a continuum of competitive ￿rms indexed by i 2 [0;1]. Each ￿rm￿ s objective is to maximize
its discounted dividend,
9According to Davis, Haltiwanger, Jarmin and Miranda (2006), the average number of works is about 15 for
privately held ￿rms and 4000 for publicly traded ￿rms. Hence, the average idiosyncratic ￿xed costs of labor tend to
be larger for small ￿rms than for large ￿rms.
10Although these two forces also tend to decrease the volatility of publicly-traded ￿rms, for them the upward
trend in volatility due to greater access to external ￿nancing is so much stronger than the downward trend. Hence,





where dt(i) is the dividend of ￿rm i in period t and ￿t is the representative household￿ s marginal
utility which ￿rms take as given. The production technology of each ￿rm i is given by the CES
function,
yt(i) = f!k￿
t (i) + (1 ￿ !)[Atnt(i)]
￿g
1
￿ ; !;￿ 2 (0;1); (2)
where At represents aggregate labor-augmenting technology, n(i) and k(i) are ￿rm-level employment
and capital, respectively. Each ￿rm accumulates capital according to the law of motion,
kt+1(i) = (1 ￿ ￿)kt(i) + "t(i)it(i); (3)
where i(i) ￿ 0 denotes irreversible investment and "(i) is an idiosyncratic shock to the marginal
e¢ ciency of investment, which has the cumulative distribution function F("). In each period t, a
￿rm needs to pay wage bill wtnt(i), decides whether to invest in ￿xed capital and distribute the
dividend d(i) to households.
Firms￿investment is ￿nanced by internal cash ￿ ows and external funds. Firms raise external
funds through borrowing by issuing one-period debt (bond), bt+1(i), which pays the competitive
market interest rate rt ￿ 1. We focus on debt ￿nancing in this paper because it accounts for 75%
to 100% of the total amount of external funds used by corporate ￿rms.11 This means that a ￿rm
can also invest in bonds issued by other ￿rms (i.e., we allow bt+1(i) to be negative).12 As a result,
at the aggregate we have the bond market clearing condition,
Z 1
0
bt+1(i)di = 0: (4)
A ￿rm￿ s divident in period t is hence given by
dt(i) = yt(i) +
bt+1(i)
rt
￿ it(i) ￿ wtnt(i) ￿ bt(i). (5)
We assume that ￿rms cannot pay negative evident,
dt ￿ 0; (6)
11Source: Federal Reserve U.S. ￿ ow of Funds Data.
12Firms do not have to lend to each other directly. Intra-￿rm lending can be achieved through ￿nancial internedi-
ation.
7which is the same as saying that ￿xed investment is ￿nanced entirely by internal cash ￿ ows, y(i)￿
wn(i), and external funds net of loan payment,
bt+1(i)
rt ￿ b(i).
Due to imperfect ￿nancial market, ￿rms are borrowing constrained. We impose a borrowing
limit as in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997),
bt+1(i) ￿ ￿kt(i); (7)
which speci￿es that the new debt issued cannot exceed a proportion of the collateral value of a ￿rms￿
existing capital stock. Thus, the parameter ￿ ￿ 0 measures the degree of ￿nancial development.
Namely, the larger the value of ￿, the more developed is the ￿nancial market. When ￿ = 0, the
model is identical to one that prohibits external ￿nancing.13



















t = wt. It follows that both the output-capital ratio
yt(i)
kt(i)
and the labor-capital ratio
nt(i)
kt(i) are indepedent of the index i (i.e., identical across ￿rms). Hence,
we can de￿ne the ￿rm￿ s net revenue as a linear function of its capital stock,
yt(i) ￿ wtnt(i) ￿ R(wt;At)kt(i); (9)
where Rt is a function of the real wage and the technology level. Such a linear relationship between
cash ￿ ow and the capital stock implies that the aggregate cash ￿ ow will depend only on the aggregate
capital stock. It means that there is no need to keep track of the distribution of kt(i) for aggregate
dynamics, thus simplifying our analysis greatly. With the de￿nition in (9), the ￿rm￿ s investment















kt+1(i) = (1 ￿ ￿)kt(i) + "t(i)it(i); (11)
it(i) ￿ 0; (12)
13If ￿rms cannot issue bond, then the bond market does not exist. Hence, bt+1(i) = 0 for all i in equilibrium.




bt+1(i) ￿ ￿kt(i): (14)
Denote {￿(i), ￿(i), ￿(i), ￿t(i)} as the Lagrangian multipliers of constraints (11)-(14), re-
spectively, the ￿rm￿ s ￿rst order conditions for {it(i);kt+1(i);bt+1(i)} are given respectively by

















and the complementarity slackness conditions, ￿t(i)it(i) = 0; [Rtkt(i) ￿ it(i) ￿ xt(i) +
bt+1(i)
rt ￿
bt(i)]￿t(i) = 0 and ￿t(i)[￿kt(i)￿bt+1(i)] = 0. Notice that by equation (16) ￿(i) is independent of i
if the idiosyncratic shocks are iid, which we assume to be the case in this paper.
2.2 Decision Rules for Investment
The decision rules are characterized by an optimal cuto⁄ strategy featuring an endogenous cuto⁄
value for the idiosyncratic shocks, "￿
t, which is time varying but constant across ￿rms (i.e., indepen-
dent of idiosyncratic uncertainty). This property is crucial for closed-form solutions of ￿rm-level
decision rules. Consider two possibilities:
Case A: "t(i) ￿ "￿
t. In this case ￿rm i receives a favorable shock and investment is considered
e¢ cient. Suppose this induces the ￿rm to invest, then we have it(i) > 0 and ￿t(i) = 0. Equations







[1 + ￿t+1(i)]Rt+1 + (1 ￿ ￿)￿t+1(i) + ￿￿t+1(i)
￿
: (18)












where the right-hand side de￿nes the cuto⁄ "￿
t, which is clearly independent of i because the
idiosyncratic shocks are iid. Therefore, all ￿rms adop the same cuto⁄ value so the aggregate
dynamics are independent of the distribution of ￿rms. Since ￿(i) = 0, equation (15) becomes
91 + ￿t(i) =
"t(i)
"￿
t . Hence, ￿t(i) > 0 if and only if "t(i) > "￿
t. It follows that under "case A" ￿rm i
opts to invest at full capacity,
















where the right-hand side de￿nes the cuto⁄ ￿￿
t, which is independent of i. Note ￿￿
t ￿ 0 because it











t ￿ 0, we have ￿t(i) > 0 when "t(i) > "￿
t; which means that under "case A" ￿rms are
willing to borrow up to the borrowing limit, bt+1(i) = ￿kt(i), to ￿nance investment. Therefore, the







kt(i) ￿ bt(i): (23)





(1 ￿ ￿) > ￿, is always satis￿ed.14
Case B: "t(i) < "￿
t. In this case ￿rm i receives a unfavorable shock. Assume that the ￿rm decides
to under-invest, it(i) < Rtkt(i) +
bt+1
~ Rt ￿ bt, then the multiplier ￿t(i) = 0. Equation (15) implies
￿t(i) = 1
"(i) ￿ 1
"￿ > 0. Hence, con￿rming our assumption, the ￿rm opts not to invest, it(i) = 0.
Since
R 1
0 bt+1(i)di = 0, and bt+1(i) = ￿kt(i) > 0 when "t(i) > "￿
t(i), there must exist ￿rms indexed
by j such that bt+1(j) < 0 if "t(j) < "￿
t. It then follows that ￿t(i) = ￿￿
t = 0 under "case B". That
is, ￿rms receiving unfavorable shocks will not invest in ￿xed capital but opt to invest in ￿nancial
assets in the bond market by lending a portion of their cash ￿ ows to other (productive) ￿rms.
14The steady state of the model economy is de￿ned as the situation without aggregate uncertainty. Hence,











(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿
￿
kt￿1(i) ￿ 0. Notice that this condition is certainly satis￿ed when ￿ = 0.









kt(i) ￿ bt(i): if "(i) ￿ "￿
0 if "(i) < "￿
: (24)












"￿ dF(") is the option value of one unit of cash ￿ ow.
Given one dollar in hand, if not invested, its￿value is still one dollar. This case happens with
probability F. On the other hand, if the ￿rm opts to invest, the cash return is
"(i)
"￿ > 1 provided
"(i) > "￿. Hence, the option value Q > 1.
Equation (25) determines the equilibrium interest rate of bond, rt. For ￿rms who decide to lend
(investing in bonds), one dollar saving yields rt dollars tomorrow, which has the option value of
Qt+1. Notice that r < 1
￿ in the steady state because Q("￿) > 1. This may help explain the low risk-
free rate puzzle of the asset pricing literature. By the de￿nition of the cuto⁄ (19), "￿
t ￿ 1
￿t(i), which
is the inverse of the marginal value of capital, the Euler equation (16) implies that the optimal




























t+1 dF("). Notice that 1
"￿
t is the equity value of one unit
installed capital for all ￿rms. Namely, one unit of cash ￿ ow can buy "￿ units of claims of a ￿rm￿ s
capital stock. The right hand side of the above equation has three components. First, one unit
of newly installed capital tomorrow can generate R units of cash ￿ ow with an option value of
RQ. Second, this unit of capital has a residual equity value of 1￿￿
"￿ after depreciation. Third, one
additional unit of capital allows the ￿rm to raise external funds by ￿
r units, which amounts to
additional cash value of ￿
r (Q ￿ 1), where Q ￿ 1 is the net option value of one unit of loan. Net
option value applies here because borrowing must involve repayment. Hence, the right-hand side of
equation (26) measures the expected marginal value of new capital (investment), which by arbitrage
11must equal the equity price of currently installed capital on the left-hand side.
Notice that if Q = 1, then equation (26) is reduced to a standard neoclassical equation for
investment. This would be the case if there were no idiosyncratic shocks in our model. That is, the
option value Q > 1 is the consequence of idiosyncratic shocks and irreversible investment, which
induce ￿rms to postpone investment when receiving bad shocks.15
Equation (26) and equation (24) are the key equations to understand the model.16 Equation
(24) shows that optimal investment at the ￿rm level is proportional to the ￿rm￿ s existing stock





. This has the
following implications.





measures the responsiveness of a ￿rm￿ s investment rate (or investment-to-capital ratio) to its idio-
syncratic shocks. Clearly, the larger the value of ￿, the higher the investment rate or the investment-
to-capital ratio when the ￿rm opts to invest. This suggests that as ￿ increases, investment is more
variable at the ￿rm level. Secondly, as will be shown shortly, the cuto⁄ value increases with ￿ (i.e.,
d"￿
d￿ > 0). Hence, the probability that a ￿rm will undertake capital investment will decrease when ￿
increases (because it(i) > 0 if and only if "(i) > "￿). This suggests that a ￿rm￿ s investment becomes
relatively less frequent with a larger ￿. Putting together, ￿nancial development makes ￿rm-level
investment lumpier and more volatile.
2) Since aggregate technology shocks a⁄ect ￿rms￿investment through cash ￿ ow (i.e., through the
function Rt), aggregate investment
R 1
0 i(i)di will respond less to aggregate technology shocks when
￿ is larger, because cash ￿ ow becomes less important for investment ￿nancying when external funds
are available. Therefore, the variability of aggregate employment (as well as output) is reduced by
￿nancial development.
3) In addition, since ￿nancial development promotes investment e¢ ciency by allowing greater
degrees of risk sharing and credit-resource allocation across ￿rms, the aggregate capital stock to
labor ratio increases with ￿. Thus, if the production function is CES and the aggregate shocks
15Notice that in our model the constraint it ￿ 0 does not bind with respect to aggregate shocks if the support of
idiosyncratic shocks is [0;1]. In this case it is impossible for all ￿rm to have zero investment in the same period
no matter how low the aggregate productivity shock is, because there is always a positive fraction of ￿rms with
large enough "(i) to undertake investment. Hence, in our model irreversible investment matters only with respect to
idiosyncratic shocks. In this regard, the option value Q > 1 implicitly re￿ ects irreversible investment.
16In our model the marginal value of installed capital (equity price) is given by ￿t(i) =
1
"￿
t (￿) and the marginal
cost of investment is given by
1
"t(i). Hence, Tobin￿ s q is given by qt(i) =
"t(i)
"￿
t (￿), indicating that it is optimal to invest
if "(i) ￿ "
￿ and not optimal to invest if "(i) < "
￿. In our general equilibrium model, Tobin￿ s q is a⁄ected by both
idiosyncratic shocks and aggregate shocks and is procyclical under both types of shocks (because "
￿
t decreases when
aggregate productivity increases). However, the degree of procyclicality of the aggregate q under aggregate shocks
depends negatively on the value of ￿. The more developed is the ￿nancial market, the less variations there are in the
average (or aggregate) value of q because "
￿
t is less variable.
12are from labor-augmenting technologies, then the impact of technology shocks on aggregate output
is smaller when the value of ￿ is larger (due to a larger capital-labor ratio), further reducing the
importance of aggregate shocks on economic activities.
3 General Equilibrium
3.1 Households
To close the model, we add a standard representative household into the model. The representative













subject to the budget constraint,
Ct ￿ wtNt + Dt; (28)
where Dt =
R 1
0 dt(i)di is the aggregate dividend income from ￿rms. Let ￿t be the Lagrangian
multiplier of the budget constraint. Notice that the household has no incentive to buy bonds
issued by ￿rms because the equilibrium rate of return to bond is lower than the inverse of the time
preference, r < 1












0 nt(i)di, Kt =
R 1
0 kt(i)di, It =
R 1
0 it(i)di and Yt =
R 1
0 yt(i)di. By the law of large
numbers and the fact that "t(i) is independent of the predetermined variables fbt(i);kt(i)g and







The aggregate capital stock evolves according to Kt+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)Kt + P("￿





￿1 measures the average e¢ ciency of investment. Similarly, equation










N. It follows that the aggregate production function is given by Yt =
13f!K￿
t + (1 ￿ !)[AtNt]
￿g
1
￿. By the property of constant returns to scale, the de￿ned function





, which equals the
marginal product of aggregate capital. Because
R 1
0 bt(i)di = 0, the aggregate dividend is given by
Dt = Yt ￿ It ￿ wtNt: The household resource constraint then becomes Ct + It = Yt.
In summary, the aggregate variables in this model include fIt;Ct;Yt;Nt;Rt;"￿
t;rt;wt;Kt+1g and































Ct + It = Yt; (33)
Yt = f!K￿












































￿1. Notice that if ￿ = 0,
this model reduces to a baseline model without external ￿nancing.
3.3 Steady State
The steady state of the model is de￿ned as the situation without aggregate uncertainty (i.e., At = 1).










K[1 ￿ F]; (41)
￿K = PI: (42)
Substituting out r and I
K in (41) gives ￿
P = (R + ￿￿Q)[1 ￿ F]. Hence, the marginal product of





Since P(1 ￿ F) =
R
"￿"￿ "dF("), equation (31) implies
1
"￿Q("￿)








which determines the optimal cuto⁄"￿ in the steady state as a function of the structural parameters.





d[P (1 ￿ F)]
d"￿ < 0: (45)




That is, ￿nancial development means that the probability of undertaking capital investment (Pr(" >
"￿)) is reduced, making ￿rm-level investment lumpier. This is so because less e¢ cient ￿rms ￿nd
bonds more attractive than ￿xed capital to buy. On the other hand, since
dQ
d"￿ < 0, Equation (40)
implies that r also increases, suggesting that the rate of return to bond increases. Consequently,
more ￿rms are willing to invest in bond and this allows the most productive ￿rms to invest in ￿xed
capital by raising debts.
Because the e⁄ect of ￿ on the real wage depends on its e⁄ect on the aggregate capital stock,
which in turn depends both on the e¢ ciency of individual ￿rms￿investment and on the number
15of investing ￿rms, we need to express the steady-state output-capital ratio as a function of ￿ more
analytically so as to conduct comparative statics. For this purpose, we assume Pareto distribution
for the idiosyncratic shock, F(") = 1 ￿ "￿￿, with ￿ > 1 and the support (1;1). With the Pareto
distribution, we have Q = 1+ 1
￿￿1"￿￿￿ and P =
￿













which is strictly positive (because ￿ < 1 and ￿ > 1) and decreasing in ￿. Since ￿K = PI, the













which is increasing in ￿. These suggest that ￿nancial development enhances investment returns
and capital accumulation. Hence, both the capital-output ratio and the capital-labor ratio rise
with ￿. As the capital-labor ratio rises, the marginal product of capital declines and the real wage
(marginal product of labor) increases.
To sum up, with ￿nancial development, two forces are at work to reduce aggregate volatility
under aggregate productivity shocks. First, aggregate shocks a⁄ect investment mainly through their
e⁄ect on ￿rms￿operating pro￿ts (revenues). With the development of the ￿nancial market, ￿rms
increasingly ￿nance their investment through external borrowing. Hence, their operating pro￿ts
become less important, leading to a decline in aggregate investment volatility. Second, ￿nancial
development improves investment e¢ ciency. Hence, capital becomes relatively cheaper than labor.
As a result, ￿rms employ more and more capital goods and thus labor augmenting technology
plays a smaller and smaller role in production, leading to a decline in aggregate volatility under
technology shocks. The ￿rst force alone is su¢ cient for reducing aggregate volatility regardless the
technology is labor augmenting or not. But the second force reinforces the ￿rst.
Notice that when ￿ approaches in￿nity, the mean of the Pareto distribution approaches one and
the variance approaches zero. In this case, all ￿rms become identical and lim￿!1 "￿ = lim￿!1 Q =
lim￿!1 P = 1. The benchmark model then degenerates to the standard RBC model.
3.4 Calibration and Impulse Responses
Let the time period be a quarter, the time discount rate ￿ = 0:99, the rate of capital depreciation
￿ = 0:025, and the inverse labor supply elasticity ￿ = 0 (indivisible labor). We choose ! = 0:25
16and ￿ = 0:175 so that the implied steady-state capital￿ s income share is about 0:42 when ￿ = 0
(our benchmark value).17 The law of motion for aggregate technology follows an AR(1) process,
logAt = ￿logAt￿1 + "t; (49)
where ￿ = 0:9. The Pareto-distribution parameter is set to ￿ = 2:5.18 The impulse responses of
the model to a one-standard-deviation aggregate technology shock are graphed in Figure 2, where
the solid lines represent the case with ￿ = 0 and the dashed lines the case with ￿ = 0:5. With these
calibrated parameter values, the reduction in GDP volatility is about 40%.
Figure 2. Impulse Responses to Technology Shock (solid line: ￿ = 0; dashed line: ￿ = 0:5).
17Assuming Cobb-Douglas production function (￿ = 0) gives qualitatively similar results. When the production
technology is Cobb-Douglas, labor augmenting technology shocks are identical to TFP shocks. However, the volatility
e⁄ects of ￿nancial development are stronger under labor augmenting technology shocks than under TFP shocks
because a larger ￿ implies a larger capital stock to output ratio and a smaller impact of At on production.
18The variance of the Pareto distribution is a decreasing function of ￿. The empirical literature based on distrib-
utions of ￿rm size typically ￿nds ￿ close to 1 (see, e.g., Axtell, 2001). The smaller the value of ￿, the larger is the
reduction in aggregate volatility and the increase in ￿rm-level volatility when ￿ increases. Reducing ￿ makes it easier
for our model to generate the diverging trends. Hence, ￿ = 2:5 is a very conservative number. We choose ￿ = 2:5 so
that the ￿rm-level volatility is roughly ten times the aggregate volatility, as in the data.
17Figure 2 suggests that, with ￿nancial development, aggregate output, consumption, investment
and employment all become signi￿cantly less volatile under technology shocks. For example, the
standard deviation of output is reduced by about 40%, consumption by 37%, investment by 57%,
and employemnt by 24%. This suggests that, even if monetary policy had not changed (Clarida,
Gali and Gertler, 2000), the inventory management technology had not improved (Kahn, McConnel,
and Perez-Quiros, 2001), and the variance of aggregate technology shocks had not reduced (Arias,
Hansen and Ohanian, 2007; and Stock and Watson, 2002), the volatility of the U.S. economy would
still decrease signi￿cantly, simply because of ￿nancial developments alone.19
4 Explaining the Diverging Trends
Note that in our model the measure of ￿rm-level volatility is identical to the measure of dispersion
across ￿rms. Following Comin and Philippon (2005), we measure the ￿rm-level volatility in our
model by the standard deviation of the median (or average) ￿rm￿ s sales growth. The constant-
returns-to-scale production function implies that ￿rm￿ s sales (output) and labor are proportional
to capital stock. Hence, we can use capital growth rate, gt(i) =
kt+1(i)
kt(i) ￿ 1, as our measure. Since




















"t(i) if "t(i) > "￿
: (50)
Notice that the mean growth rate is zero, ￿ g(i) = Egt(i) = 0, because it is the same as the aggregate
capital growth rate in the steady state,
Kt+1
Kt ￿ 1 = 0.21 Hence, the variance of the average-￿rm￿ s
19The implied aggregate debt to output ratio is about 24% when ￿ = 0:05 and about 40% when ￿ = 0:5. In the U.S.
economy, non-￿nancial ￿rms￿total debt to GDP ratio has doubled from about 23% to 48% in the past half century.
Our model predicts that if the debt to output ratio doubles, aggregate output volatility will decrease by about 35%,
everything else equal.
20Except the ￿rm in the middle, a ￿rm￿ s debt level bt(i) is indeterminate in the model. The only thing we know is
that
R
b(i)di = 0. Ignoring bt(i) tends to under estimate a ￿rm￿ s investment volatility. When "t(i) > "
￿
t, the variance
of investment is the variance of bt(i) plus the variance of the ￿rst term in the decision rule (24). Since the variance
of ￿rm￿ s investment and borrowing activity increases with ￿, the variance of bt(i) also increases with ￿.
21One can con￿rm this by computing the true average growth rate,








18capital growth is given by Eg2
t(i) = ￿2 (￿￿1)2





"￿￿ ￿ 1: (51)
Because d"￿
d￿ > 0, our model implies that ￿rm-level volatility increases with ￿nancial development.
Figure 3. Diverging Trends in Aggregate and Firm-Level Volatility.
In the U.S. data, ￿rm-level volatility is about ten times the aggregate volatility on average
over time. Thus we calibrate the variance of idiosyncratic shocks (￿ = 2:5) and that of aggregate
shocks (￿A = 0:02) in our model to match this volatility ratio. Given that the variance of idiosyn-
cratic shocks dominates that of aggregate shocks, the in￿ uence of idiosyncratic shocks on ￿rm-level
volatility dominates that of aggregate shocks in our model.22 Thus, ignoring aggregate uncertainty
does not have a signi￿cant e⁄ect on our measure of ￿rm-level volatility. The predicted trends of
￿rm-level volatility and aggregate volatility are plotted in Figure 3, where the left window shows
aggregate volatility (scaled up by a factor of ten so as to be comparable to ￿rm-level volatility),
22Without idiosyncratic shocks, the time trend of ￿rm-level volatility mimics that of aggregate volatility in our
model and the dispersion is always zero.
19the right window shows the ￿rm-level volatility, with the horizontal axis indicating the degree of
￿nancial development (i.e., the value of ￿). It clearly shows that the two trends of volatility are
diverging as the ￿nancial market develops, consistent with the empirical facts documented by the
empirical literature cited in the beginning of this paper.
5 Discussion
More recently, Davis, Haltiwanger, Jarmin and Miranda (2006) showed that the increasing trend
in ￿rm-level volatility applies only to publicly traded ￿rms who have access to external ￿nancing.
Using recently developed Longitudinal Business Database (LBD), they found that the opposite is
true for privately held ￿rms who do not have excess to outside funds. Namely, for privately held
small ￿rms, there has been a large secular decline in the cross ￿rm dispersion of ￿rm growth rates
and in the average magnitude of ￿rm-level volatility. This is in sharp contrast to the behavior of
publicly traded ￿rms. In this section we o⁄er some preliminary explanations for this phenomenon
and argue that our model is not inconsistent with this empirical fact.
Our argument is based on the prediction that ￿nancial development raises the real wage. The
rising share of wage costs may reduce the sensitivity of ￿rms￿labor demand to idiosyncratic labor
costs more so for privately held ￿rms than for publicly traded ￿rms due to di⁄erence in ￿rm size.23
Consequently, volatility and dispersion across privately held ￿rms decrease with rising wage costs.
This is illustrated in a simple extension of our benchmark model below.
Suppose there is a continuum of privately held ￿rms with measure M indexed by j 2 [1;M +1].
According to Davis, Haltiwanger, Jarmin and Miranda (2006), the number of privately-held ￿rms
is several hundreds times that of publicly-traded ￿rms in the data; hence, we assume M >> 1.
To keep the model as stylized as possible, we assume that privately held ￿rms do not accumulate
capital. To simplify notation, privately held ￿rms are called sector 2 with output and employment
denoted by y2t and n2t, respectively, while publicly traded ￿rms are called sector 1 with output
and employment denoted by y1t and n1t. The production technology of sector 2 is given by
y2t(j) = aAtn￿
2t(j); 0 < ￿ < 1: (52)
where A is the economy-wide aggregate labor-augmenting technology shock common to both sectors.
The unit labor cost for sector 2￿ s ￿rm is wt + et(j), where w is the aggregate real wage and
e(j) is an idiosyncratic cost shock to ￿rm j in sector 2. The ￿rm in sector 2 maximizes pro￿t,
Atan￿
2t(j) ￿ [wt + et(j)]n2t(j), in each period. Suppose the distribution of e(j) is binary with
23According to Davis, Haltiwanger, Jarmin and Miranda (2006), the average number of works is about 15 for
privately held ￿rms and 4000 for publicly traded ￿rms. Hence, the idiosyncratic ￿xed costs of labor tend to be more
important for small ￿rms than for large ￿rms. For this reason, we introduce an idiosyncratic labor cost only to
privately held ￿rms in our extended general-equilibrium model.
20e(j) = ￿ e (with probability ￿) and e(j) = 0 (with probability 1 ￿ ￿). The optimal labor demand in
sector 2 is then given by
n2t(j) =
8
> > > <










￿￿1 ; with prob. 1 ￿ ￿
; (53)

















The ￿rst-order conditions for the publicly traded ￿rms (sector 1) remain the same as before, and
so do the household￿ s ￿rst-order conditions. The only equations that are changed are the aggregate
resource contraints for labor and goods. The labor market clearing condition requires
n1 + Mn2 = N: (55)
Since the household owns all ￿rms in sectors 1 and 2, the aggregate budget constraint becomes
Ct + It + M￿￿ e
￿




= y1t + y2t = Yt; (56)
where the left-hand side is total expenditure (consumption, investment and labor costs), and the
right hand side is the total income.
Several steps are needed to determine the steady-state values of the 2-sector model. As in the
benchmark model, we ￿rst solve the steady-state cuto⁄ value "￿ for sector 1, which is the same
as in the benchmark model and not a⁄ected by the introduction of sector 2. The next step is to
determine the real wage in the steady state. Again, the real wage remains the same because of
competitive labor market and labor mobility. Given the real wage (w), labor demand and output
in sector 2 are then determined by equations (53) and (54).
The ￿rm-level volatility for sector 1 remains the same as in the benchmark model. For privately
held ￿rms, we compute the volatility of labor growth (which is the same as output growth) in the
21steady state as follows. Taking log of equation (53), the employment growth rate is given by
gn =
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
0 with prob. ￿2 + (1 ￿ ￿)2
1
￿￿1 [ln(w) ￿ ln(w + ￿ e)] with prob. ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
1
￿￿1[ln(w + ￿ e) ￿ ln(w)] with prob. ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
(57)





[ln(w + ￿ e) ￿ ln(w)] (58)







w+￿ e ￿ 1
w
i
< 0. Hence, the ￿rm-level volatility and dispersion
decrease with ￿nancial development in sector 2.
Table 1. Parameter Values
Parameter ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿ ￿ M ￿ e a ￿ ￿A
Value 0:99 0:025 0 2:5 0:25 0:175 0:9 0:5 100 0:2 1:35 0:9 0:02
We calibrate the structural parameters of the model as in Table 1. These parameter values
imply that the ratio of ￿xed labor cost to the real wage is about 8% whent ￿ = 0 and about 1%
when ￿ = 0:5. These values also imply that the volatility of privately-held ￿rms is several times
larger than that of publicly-traded ￿rms when ￿ is small. The predicted trends of growth volatility
for setor 1, sector 2, and the aggregate output are graphed in the bottom windows in Figure 4,
where the left window shows aggregate volatility (scaled up by a factor of ten) and the right window
shows ￿rm-level volatility (green line represents privately-held ￿rms and red line publicly-traded
￿rms). The model clearly captures qualitatively the converging trends in volatility for privately-
held ￿rms and publicly-traded ￿rms reported by Davis, Haltiwanger, Jarmin and Miranda (2006,
Fig.1 ￿Fig.10).24 At the same time, the 2-sector model continues to predict a downward trend in
24The top right window is a replication of their Fig. 5.
22aggregate volatility under technology shocks.
Figure 4. Top Windows: US Data. Bottom Windows: 2-Sector Model.
6 Conclusion
Empirical studies found that volatilities have been increasing at the ￿rm level (for publicly-traded
￿rms) but decreasing at the aggregate level. We o⁄er a uni￿ed explanation for this diverging
trend puzzle. Our explanation is based on a story of ￿nancial development that relaxes borrowing
constraints and promotes risk sharing across ￿rms. Our dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
model predicts that ￿nancial liberalization increases ￿rm-level volatility by allowing more produc-
23tive ￿rms to expand capital stock through borrowing external funds and less productive ￿rms to
reduce losses through savings and investing in bonds, making ￿rm-level investment lumpier, more
heterogeneous, and more sensitive to idiosyncratic productivity shocks. At the same time, ￿nancial
development reduces aggregate volatility by making ￿rms￿operations less dependent on internal
cash ￿ ows; hence, aggregate technology shocks have less impact on ￿rms￿investment, production,
and employment, leading to a less volatile economy.
There exists another closely related empirical regularity about ￿rm-level volatility: for privately-
held ￿rms with little access to external ￿nancing, their volatility have been decreasing in the postwar
period (Davis, Haltiwanger, Jarmin and Miranda, 2006). Although explaining this third regularity
is an challenging and interesting topic for future research, we nonetheless show that our model is not
inconsistent with this empirical fact. Our preliminary explanation for this empirical fact is based on
a natural extension of our benchmark model in which ￿nancial development improves investment
e¢ ciency and raises the real wage. The rising share of wage costs may reduce the sensitivity of ￿rms￿
labor demand to idiosyncratic labor costs more so for privately held ￿rms than for publicly traded
￿rms due to di⁄erence in ￿rm size. Consequently, volatility and dispersion across privately held
￿rms decrease more signi￿cantly with rising wage costs. Our analysis in this regard is preliminary
because we have assumed that privately-held ￿rms (i.e., small ￿rms) are labor intensive and do
not accumulate capital. This simplifying assumption simpli￿es our analysis dramatically but does
not allow us to treat big ￿rms and small ￿rms symmetrically. We leave the symmetric analysis to
future research.
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